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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the absence of major climate legislation in the U.S. Senate, parties 
seeking meaningful action on climate change mitigation have turned to 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for action.  EPA’s 
augmented authority to deal with substantive aspects of climate change 
mitigation, and ultimately its creation of the Tailoring Rule, stems from 
the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.1  In this 
watershed decision, the Court found greenhouse gases (“GHGs”), 
including carbon dioxide, to be “air pollutants” as defined and regulated 
by the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).2  The Court ruled that the Act required 
EPA to determine whether GHG emissions from new motor vehicles 
cause or contribute to air pollution that may endanger public health or 
welfare, or whether the science is too uncertain to make a reasoned 
decision.3  In April 2009, EPA responded to the Court by announcing a 
finding, which affirmatively concluded that GHGs contribute to air 
pollution that may endanger public health or welfare.4 
The next key piece within the regulatory framework that shaped 
EPA’s Tailoring Rule involves a memorandum entitled “EPA’s 
Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by 
Federal Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit Program” 
(“PSD Interpretive Memo”).5  The PSD Interpretive Memo was issued in 
December 2008—in the final days of the Agency’s leadership by then-
EPA Administrator Stephen L. Johnson.6  The memorandum illustrated 
the process by which a previously unregulated pollutant could become 
 1. See, e.g., Greg Wannier, Case Analysis: Texas Moves to Block EPA Climate 
Regulations, CLIMATE L. BLOG (Sept. 25, 2010), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climate 
change/2010/09/25/texas-moves-to-block-epa-climate-regulations/. 
 2. See Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006); Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 3. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,575 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Final Tailoring Rule] (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71). 
 4. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,575. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, to Reg’l Adm’rs, EPA 
(Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/psd_interpretive_ 
memo_12.18.08.pdf [hereinafter PSD Interpretive Memo]. 
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subject to regulation, and consequently, dependent on PSD and Title V 
stationary source permitting requirements.7  This memorandum was vital 
to EPA’s attempt to lay the framework that would later allow the 
Agency to regulate GHGs through the Tailoring Rule.8  Whether a 
pollutant is “subject to regulation” is important for the purposes of 
determining whether it is covered under the CAA permitting programs.9  
“The [PSD] Interpretive Memo established that a pollutant is ‘subject to 
regulation’ only if it is subject to either a provision in the CAA or a 
regulation adopted by EPA under the CAA that requires actual control of 
emissions of that pollutant (referred to as the ‘actual control 
interpretation’).”10 
EPA later granted a petition for reconsideration of this memorandum, 
but subsequent Administrator Lisa P. Jackson signed a notice in February 
2009 that conveyed the Agency’s decision to continue applying the PSD 
Interpretive Memo’s interpretation of “subject to regulation.”11  Based 
on the contemporaneous Light-Duty Vehicle Rule (“LDVR”), the notice 
stated that the GHG requirements of LDVR would trigger CAA permitting 
requirements for stationary sources on January 2, 2011.12 
The following steps in the regulatory history of the Tailoring Rule 
were two findings issued by EPA Administrator Jackson in December 
2009.13  First, the Administrator issued an “Endangerment Finding” that the 
current and projected atmospheric concentrations of six GHG pollutants14 
“threaten the public health and welfare of current and future 
generations.”15  Second, and subsequently, the Administrator issued a 
“Cause or Contribute Finding,” which determined that “the combined 
 7. See Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,521. 
 8. See generally Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3. 
 9. 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5–85, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.deq.state.va. 
us/air/pdf/airregs/8500.pdf. 
 10. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,521. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
endangerment.html (last updated Sept. 21, 2011). 
 14. Carbon dioxide (“CO2”), methane (“CH4”), nitrous oxide (“N2O”), 
hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”), perfluorocarbons (“PFCs”), and sulfur hexafluoride 
(“SF6”). 
 15. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, supra note 13; Lynn L. Bergeson, EPA Issues 
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emissions of these well-mixed greenhouse gases from new motor 
vehicles and . . . engines contribute to the greenhouse gas pollution which 
threatens public health and welfare.”16  While these findings imposed 
no new requirements, they were a prerequisite to finalizing the GHG 
standards for light-duty vehicles under LDVR.17 
The confluence of these events gave EPA the authority to regulate 
GHG emissions under the PSD and Title V stationary source 
permitting programs.18  However, regulation under the Act poses some 
complexities for EPA.  The Act’s current thresholds for regulating 
“criteria pollutants,” congressionally-defined pollutants that endanger 
public health and the environment, such as lead, sulfur dioxide, and 
nitrogen dioxide, are 100 or 250 tons per year (“tpy”).19  While such a 
level is appropriate for the existing criteria pollutants, the applicability 
criteria requires tailoring as GHG are emitted at a scale that dwarfs the 
emissions of the conventional criteria pollutants.20  For that reason, the 
Tailoring Rule is imperative; without it, PSD and Title V requirements 
would have applied, as of January 2, 2011, to the emission of GHG at 
the 100/250 tpy levels presently provided under the CAA.21  That is 
problematic as it would greatly increase the number of required permits, 
impose undue costs on small sources, overwhelm the limited resources 
of permitting authorities, and severely impair the functioning of the 
permitting programs.22 
In the months following EPA’s release of the Tailoring Rule, a number 
of states, organizations, and industry groups issued legal challenges to 
EPA’s proposed action.23  Many of the legal challenges concerning the 
Tailoring Rule, including one by the State of Texas, challenge EPA’s 
reliance on the legal doctrines of “absurd results” and “administrative 
 16. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, supra note 13. 
 17. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,519. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Fact Sheet—Proposed Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title 
V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/fs20090930action. 
html (last updated July 22, 2011). 
 20. Don J. Frost, Jr., Henry C. Eisenberg, William L. Thomas & Kenneth Berlin, 
EPA Finalizes Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, SKADDEN, http://www.skadden.com/ 
Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=2087 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 21. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,516.  
 22. Id. at 31,514. 
 23. Robin Bravender, EPA Issues Final ‘Tailoring’ Rule for Greenhouse Gas 




VINCENT - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2016  1:13 PM 
[VOL. 3:  393, 2011–12]  Administrative Absurdity 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
necessity.”24  This Comment analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of 
the arguments advanced by EPA as well as its opponents regarding the 
Agency’s reliance on these administrative law doctrines to “tailor” PSD 
and Title V applicability criteria.  The Comment concludes with an 
explanation of why the judiciary will likely rule in EPA’s favor in this 
instance. 
Part I of this Comment introduces the Tailoring Rule, including its 
background and the emissions thresholds it seeks to implement regarding 
PSD and Title V programs.  Part II presents EPA’s legal basis for the 
creation and subsequent implementation of the Tailoring Rule, including 
the concept of Chevron deference, the absurd results doctrine, as 
well as the administrative necessity doctrine and the doctrines’ 
applications to and within the Tailoring Rule.  Part III addresses some of 
the legal challenges of the Tailoring Rule, with a focus on the state of 
Texas’s arguments and the strength and weaknesses of these challenges.  
Part III also argues that the judiciary should endorse EPA’s use of the 
absurd results and administrative necessity doctrines and sanction the 
Tailoring Rule based on the legal argument that the decision to issue and 
implement the rule was subject to Chevron deference.  Part IV concludes 
with a summary of the legal arguments proposed throughout the Comment. 
II.  THE TAILORING RULE 
In May 2010, EPA released the final version of the “Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule” 
(“Tailoring Rule”) in what was the agency’s first concerted attempt to 
regulate GHGs from stationary sources.25  In this rulemaking, EPA 
modified the applicability criteria that determine which stationary sources 
and modification projects are subject to permitting requirements for 
GHG emissions under the PSD and Title V programs of the CAA.26 
Under this tailoring approach, GHG regulation will apply only to new 
facilities with the potential to emit (“PTE”) 100,000 tpy or more and 
modifications at existing facilities that increase GHG emissions by at 
 24. State of Texas’ Motion for a Stay of EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
ATTN’Y GEN. OF TX. (Sept. 15, 2010), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/ 
releases/2010/091610motion_to_stay_tailoring.pdf. 
 25. Bravender, supra note 23; see also EPA New Source Review Regulatory 
Actions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/actions.html#2010 (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 26. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,514. 
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least 75,000 tpy—rather than the 250 and 100 tpy levels, respectively, 
for traditional pollutants under the CAA.27  Sources emitting less than 
50,000 tpy and that refrain from modifications resulting in net GHG 
increases of more than 50,000 tpy CO2e (“carbon dioxide equivalent”) 
will not be subject to PSD or Title V permitting until April 30, 2016.28  
This decision was made in light of the finding that the administrative 
burdens accompanying permitting sources below this level would be so 
great that neither streamlining actions nor hiring additional administrative 
staff would remedy the condition before the date of implementation.29 
Under the provisions of the CAA, excluding from consideration the 
conditions of the Tailoring Rule, sources that have PTE 250 tpy or more 
of regulated air pollutants, or 100 tpy or more if a source belongs to a list 
of 28 specified source categories, are deemed “major sources” for purposes 
of the federal PSD program.30  A major source or any source proposing 
new construction must conduct a Best Available Control Technology 
(“BACT”) analysis.31  The source must undertake a BACT analysis for 
not only pollutants with a PTE over the major source threshold, but also 
for all pollutants subject to regulation that have PTE over a specified 
emissions threshold — an amount deemed the “significance level.”32  If 
any modification to a major source is proposed, a PSD permit will be 
required if the modification results in a net increase in emissions equal to 
or in excess of the significance level of any pollutant subject to 
regulation.33 
In contrast, the Title V operating permit program generally applies to 
sources that have PTE of at least 100 tpy of air pollutants subject to 
regulation under the CAA.34  A facility subject to the Title V program 
has one year from the time that it first becomes subject to the program to 
submit a permit application.35 
Given these low applicability thresholds under the PSD and Title V 
program, regulating GHGs without the mitigation of the Tailoring 
Rule would produce a number of significant problems.36 
 27. Id. at 31,516. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2011). 
 31. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,520. 
 32. Frost, Jr. et al., supra note 20; see also Public Participation: Permits, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/permit/psd-public-part.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
 33. Frost, Jr. et al., supra note 20. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See generally Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,516. 
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It is not too much to say that applying PSD requirements literally to GHG sources at 
the present time—in the absence of streamlining or increasing permitting 
authority resources and without tailoring the definition of “major emitting facility” 
or “modification”—would result in a program that would have been unrecognizable 
to the Congress that designed PSD.37 
It was the intent of Congress that PSD be “limited to a relatively small 
number of large industrial sources.”38  EPA estimated that the number of 
sources that would require PSD permits each year based on the existing 
CAA thresholds would increase from approximately 280 permits currently 
to 82,000 permits each year.39  A significant percentage of these permits 
would be required in connection with modifications for commercial and 
residential projects,40 sources that prior to the enactment of the Tailoring 
Rule were largely not subject to federal regulation.41  EPA also estimates 
that Title V permits would be required for over 6 million sources without 
implementation of the mitigating effects of the Tailoring Rule compared 
to the 14,700 sources previously subject.42 
Cognizant of this administrative burden, EPA subsequently revised its 
estimate of the average permit processing time for PSD and Title V 
permits.43  Without an expansion of regulatory resources to process the 
permits, PSD permit processing would increase to three years and Title V 
permits would take, on average, about ten years to process.44  The costs 
of such an expansive program would certainly be immense.  For example, 
EPA estimates that the total nationwide additional burden for permitting 
authorities for Title V permits from adding GHG emissions at the 100 
tpy threshold without the Tailoring Rule would be 340 million hours—
a cost of over $15 billion.45  Such information only helps to underscore 
the viability of EPA’s use of the doctrines of absurd results and 
administrative necessity—a point this Comment will address in Part 
III.46 
  
 37. Id. at 31,555. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 31,555–56. 
 40. Frost, Jr. et al., supra note 20. 
 41. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,514. 
 42. Id. at 31,536. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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III.  EPA’S LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CREATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAILORING RULE 
A.  Chevron Deference and the Absurd Results Doctrine 
The doctrine of “Chevron deference” stems from the 1984 Supreme 
Court case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.47  
Chevron deference is an administrative law doctrine that implicitly extends 
the power delegated to federal administrative agencies by holding that 
courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes.48  Aside from being a canon of administrative law, it also 
provides much of the support for EPA’s interpretation of the PSD and 
Title V applicability provisions and reliance on the absurd results and 
administrative necessity doctrine. 
When parties aggrieved by a federal government agency’s interpretation 
of a statute or regulation seek judicial review,49 reviewing courts typically 
apply the Chevron doctrine50 and defer to the agency’s interpretation so 
long as it is reasonable and not contrary to the statutory or regulatory 
text.51  Chevron establishes a two-step framework for assessing an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute.52  The court asks at Step One whether Congress 
has spoken directly to the precise question at issue: “If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as 
the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”53  At this initial stage of the analysis, the administrative agency’s 
position receives no deference.54  If the statute does not unambiguously 
 47. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 48. David M. Gossett, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 681 (1997). 
 49. The judicial review chapter of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.                   
§§ 701–706, provides the ordinary means for obtaining judicial review of federal agency 
action in the absence of a more specific statutory review provision.  See 5 U.S.C. § 703 
(2006).  Congress may by statute place agency action beyond judicial review, 5 U.S.C.           
§ 701(a)(1) (2006), subject to arguable but ill-defined constitutional limitations on the 
legislative power to circumscribe judicial authority.  See Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, 
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2129–30 (2002).  
Nevertheless, there is ordinarily a presumption in favor of judicial review of agency 
action.  See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 424–45 (1995). 
 50. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. 
 51. Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 204 (2004). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 
n.45 (2001) (“We only defer, however, to agency interpretations of statutes that, 
applying the normal ‘tools of statutory construction,’ are ambiguous.”). 
 54. Armstrong, supra note 51, at 204 n.3; see e.g., Bank of America, N.A. v. FDIC, 
244 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“courts should decide whether there is ambiguity in a 
statute without regard to an agency’s prior, or current, interpretation”); Vulcan Arbor Hill 
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resolve the issue, the court proceeds to the second, more deferential, step 
of the analysis.55  At Step Two, the agency’s interpretation will be upheld so 
long as it is reasonable.56  According to the Court in Chevron, “agencies 
should interpret ambiguous statutes because they bring more expertise to 
bear on such questions, because they are politically accountable, and 
because Congress, by leaving a statute ambiguous, has delegated interstitial 
policy-making to the agencies.”57  In interpreting a statutory provision, 
an agency must, under Chevron Step One, determine whether Congress’s 
intent on a particular question is clear.58  If Congressional intent is clear, 
then the agency must comply.59  If the intent of the provision is not clear, 
then the agency may, under Step Two, fashion a reasonable interpretation of 
the provision.60 
The best indication of Congress’s intent is the plain meaning of the 
statute.61  The Supreme Court, however, has held in the case of United 
States v. Ron Pair Enterprises that the literal meaning of a statutory 
provision is not conclusive “in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of the drafters.’”62  Instead, “[i]n such cases, the intention 
of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”63  This legal 
precept has been discussed and implemented for hundreds of years;64 it 
Corp. v. Reich, 81 F.3d 1110, 1127 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(“An agency assertion of ambiguity does nothing to establish that the statute is in fact 
ambiguous”); Cajun Elec. Power Corp. v. FERC, 924 F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(holding that agency receives no deference on the question of whether the statute is 
ambiguous); Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
cf. Arizona v. Thompson, 281 F.3d 248, 253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that agency 
erred in concluding the statute was unambiguous; agency’s resulting interpretation did 
not rest upon exercise of its interpretive discretion and thus warranted no deference from 
court); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 740–42 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per 
curiam) (holding same). 
 55. Armstrong, supra note 51, at 204 n.3. 
 56. Id.  See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45. 
 57. Gossett, supra note 48, at 681. 
 58. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,542. 
 62. Id.; United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). 
 63.   Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
 64. See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *63, *91; see also Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 
188, 189–90 (N.Y. 1889). 
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was well recognized in the time of William Blackstone and came to be 
known as the “Golden Rule” of interpretation.65   
The absurd results doctrine continues to be of importance and 
interest to modern lawyers, judges, and legal commentators.66  For 
the most part, even textualist judges and commentators relax their 
general commitment to text in applicable situations.  For example, both 
Justice Antonin Scalia67 and Judge Frank Easterbrook68 have endorsed 
the doctrine in the face of absurdity.  In the implementation of the 
Tailoring Rule, EPA aspires to use the absurd results doctrine to justify 
its departure from the literal application of the CAA with regard to GHG 
emissions. 
B.  The Administrative Necessity Doctrine 
Under the administrative necessity doctrine, if an unambiguous 
statutory provision is impossible for the agency to administer, then the 
agency is not required to follow the literal requirements.69  Instead, the 
agency may adjust the requirements in as refined a manner as possible to 
assure that the requirements are administrable while still achieving 
Congress’s overall intent.70  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit set out the doctrine of administrative 
necessity in a line of cases that most prominently includes Alabama 
Power Co. v. Costle.71 
As stated in the Tailoring Rule, “[EPA] believe[s] that the ‘administrative 
necessity’ case law establishes a three-step process under which an 
administrative agency may, under the appropriate circumstances, in 
effect revise statutory requirements that the agency demonstrates are 
impossible to administer so that they are administrable.”72  Specifically: 
 65. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 31–32 (5th ed. 2009). 
 66. See e.g., Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining 
the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127 (1994); 
Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25 (2006). 
 67. See e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecking Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 
424, 451 n.4 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 
504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 68. See e.g., United States v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 236 F.3d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 69. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,543. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 31,543–44. 
402 
 
VINCENT - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2016  1:13 PM 
[VOL. 3:  393, 2011–12]  Administrative Absurdity 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
[T]he three steps are as follows: When an agency has identified what it believes 
may be insurmountable burdens in administering a statutory requirement, the 
first step the agency must take is to evaluate how it could streamline administration 
as much as possible, while remaining within the confines of the statutory 
requirements.  The second step is that the agency must determine whether it 
can justifiably conclude that even after whatever streamlining of administration 
of statutory requirements (consistent with those statutory requirements) it conducts, 
the remaining administrative tasks are impossible for the agency because they 
are beyond its resources, e.g., beyond the capacities of its personnel and funding.  If 
the agency concludes with justification that it would be impossible to administer 
the statutory requirements, as streamlined, then the agency may take the third 
step, which is to phase in or otherwise adjust the requirements so that they are 
administrable.  However, the agency must do so in a manner that is as refined as 
possible so that the agency may continue to implement as fully as possible 
Congressional intent.73 
Both the doctrines of absurd results and administrative necessity play 
important roles in the arguments and justifications both EPA and its 
challengers mount in their legal positions.  In Part IV of this Comment, 
the legal arguments of both sides will be articulated and analyzed, and a 
conclusion on the totality of litigation will be reached. 
IV.  THE JUDICIARY SHOULD VALIDATE EPA’S USE OF THE ABSURD 
RESULTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE NECESSITY DOCTRINES                                           
IN ITS TAILORING RULE 
A.  The Use of the Absurd Results and Administrative Necessity 
Doctrines Within the Tailoring Rule 
Tested precedent justifies EPA’s reliance on the doctrines of absurd 
results and administrative necessity; however, many believe that EPA 
has misconstrued the application of these legal doctrines.74  The rule 
currently faces challenges by parties ranging from the National Mining 
Association to the Sierra Club.75  Certainly, these groups come with 
diverse motives,76 but this only serves to illustrate the controversy 
surrounding the use and interpretation of these legal doctrines. 
 73. Greenhouse Gas Proposed Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,315 (Oct.  
27, 2009) [hereinafter Proposed Tailoring Rule]. 
 74. Robin Bravender, Sierra Club, States File Challenges to EPA’s ‘Tailoring’ 
Rule for Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/ 
2010/08/03/03greenwire-sierra-club-states-file-challenges-to-epas-tai-24900.html. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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One of the most recent major challenges to EPA’s Tailoring Rule 
comes from the State of Texas, where on September 16, 2010, the 
state attorney general filed a lawsuit in the D.C. Circuit to prevent its 
implementation.77  In its case, the State of Texas makes two legal 
arguments.78  First, the state argues that EPA may not employ the absurd 
results doctrine to rewrite a perfectly unambiguous statute.79  Secondly, 
Texas argues that the administrative necessity doctrine does not justify the 
Tailoring Rule’s inconsistency with the CAA.80   
1.  The Validity of EPA’s Interpretation of the Absurd                                 
Results Doctrine 
EPA believes Congress did intend that PSD and Title V apply to GHG 
sources as a general matter.81  To that end, EPA operates the tailoring 
approach by applying PSD and Title V to GHG sources, but in a phased-
in manner.  EPA’s operates the Tailoring Rule under two different and 
independent legal bases.  First, under Chevron Step One, that congressional 
intent is clear on that issue and the tailoring approach best reflects it.  
Second, in the alternative, under Chevron Step Two, that congressional 
intent is unclear and the tailoring approach is a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute.82 
Texas argues that EPA does not have the authority to apply the absurd 
results doctrine to alter an explicit statute.83  Instead of regulating all 
“major sources” as required by the CAA, the Tailoring Rule would only 
 77. Texas Files Legal Action to Block Imposition of EPA Regulations That 
Threaten Texas Jobs, TEX. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/release.php 
?id=3484 (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).  In filing this lawsuit, the Governor of Texas 
stated his belief that the Tailoring Rule is “arbitrary and capricious and is contrary to the 
Clean Air Act.”  Gabriel Nelson, Texas Joins Challengers to EPA’s Greenhouse Gas 
‘Tailoring’ Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/ 
05/05greenwire-texas-joins-challengers-to-epas-greenhouse-gas-25612.html. Pending the 
resolution of its case by the D.C. Circuit, the State of Texas asked for a stay pending the 
Court’s review.  Id.  Texas argued that EPA’s scheduled implementation of the Tailoring 
Rule “is unlawful and will cause the state of Texas immediate and irreparable harm, 
without countervailing benefit to third parties or to the public interest.”  Bergeson, 
supra note 15; PSD Interpretive Memo, supra note 6, at 8.  The Circuit Court ordered, on 
December 10, 2010, that the motions to stay be denied, writing, “Petitioners have not 
satisfied the stringent standards required for a stay pending court review.”  Associated 
Press, Texas: Court Allows E.P.A. to Issue Greenhouse Permits, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/us/13brfs-COURTALLOWSE_ BRF.html?_r=1. 
 78. Texas Files Legal Action to Block Imposition of EPA Regulations That Threaten 
Texas Jobs, supra note 77.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,516. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Bergeson, supra note 15; PSD Interpretive Memo, supra note 6, at 8. 
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allow regulation of the largest stationary source emitters.84  These include 
new facilities with PTE of 100,000 tpy or more and modifications at 
existing facilities that increase GHG emissions by at least 75,000 tpy.85 
Even assuming, arguendo, the statutory provisions under debate are not 
ambiguous, EPA claims that applying the statutory thresholds by their 
terms to GHG emissions would create absurd results.86  This is because 
PSD and Title V would then apply “to an extraordinarily large number” 
of “small” sources, the sources would incur “unduly high compliance 
costs,” and permitting authorities would then face “overwhelming” 
administrative burdens.87  EPA claims such coverage would “severely 
undermine” congressional intent.88  
The absurd results doctrine applies where “words of general 
meaning are used in a statute, and yet a consideration of the whole 
legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the 
absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the 
words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to 
include the particular act.”89  Texas distinguishes EPA’s interpretation of 
the CAA with the Supreme Court’s decision in Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co.90  In that decision, the Court construed the term “‘the 
defendant’ to exclude civil defendants, where refusing to draw that 
distinction would ‘deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an 
adversary’s testimony that [the law] grants [to] a civil defendant.’”91  
Texas argues that while the term interpreted in Green was “broad,” 
the statutory tonnage thresholds being interpreted by EPA are “objective 
commands that cannot be expanded or contracted through principles of 
statutory interpretation.”92 
 84. Douglas E. Schoen, Why Clean Energy Is the Key to America’s Global 
Leadership, FOX NEWS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/01/31/ 
clean-energy-key-americas-global-leadership/. 
 85. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,516. 
 86. Bergeson, supra note 15; PSD Interpretive Memo, supra note 6, at 9. 
 87. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,541; State of Texas’ Motion for a Stay 
of EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, supra note 24, at 9. 
 88. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,542. 
 89. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 US 457, 459 (1892). 
 90.  State of Texas’ Motion for a Stay of EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
supra note 24, at 10. 
 91. Green, 490 U.S. at 510. 
 92. State of Texas’ Motion for a Stay of EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
supra note 24, at 10–11. 
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The problem here is in making its argument, Texas failed to take 
notice of the case of United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises.93  In this 
case, the Supreme Court held that the literal meaning of a statutory 
provision is not conclusive “in the [] rare cases [in which] the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds 
with the intentions of the drafters[,] [in which case] the intention of the 
drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”94  EPA interprets the 
legislative history of the CAA and the Court’s holding in Ron Pair 
Enterprises to require that the Agency tailor the applicability criteria for 
GHGs so as “to balance environmental protection with economic growth.”95 
One sound argument made against EPA’s use of the absurd results 
doctrine comes from a member of the Unites States coal industry: 
Peabody Coal Company.96  The argument is that EPA does not identify a 
single case in which the doctrine was used to read out a numerical 
regulatory trigger for a particular situation within the purview of the 
statutory authority.97 
Peabody Coal argues that the typical “absurd results” case is one 
where “a broad statutory term is interpreted more narrowly and in context in 
order to avoid a result that Congress could not have intended.”98  Such 
cases, in the opinion of Peabody Coal, are “unlikely to justify the 
[T]ailoring [R]ule because there is no narrower, contextual meaning of 
numerical terms” that EPA can use to achieve its desired statutory 
construction.99  These numerical terms, argues Peabody Coal, are 
different from the qualitative terms that the judiciary has ruled on earlier, 
such as “defendant,” “employee,” and “radioactive material.”100 
In a sense, the above argument is correct; it is impossible to argue that 
the terms “100” or “250” may be read as “25,000” based on some 
theory of statutory interpretation.  However, this argument ignores a 
fundamental principle of the absurd results doctrine: The intention of the 
legislative drafters controls in cases in which the “literal application” of a 
statute produces results “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the 
drafters.”101  Therefore, in this instance, what one must rely on are the 
 93. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,542. 
 94. Id.; Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
 95. Frost Jr., et al., supra note 20. 
 96. Peabody Energy Co., Comments of Peabody Energy Company, TROUTMAN 
SANDERS ATT’YS AT LAW 7 (Dec. 28, 2009), available at http://www.troutmansanders. 
com/files/uploads/documents/document.pdf. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 7–8. 
 99. Id. at 8. 
 100. Id. 
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intentions of the drafters of the CAA rather than the seemingly 
unambiguous numerical trigger.102 
Moreover, as one of the primary objectives within the legislative history 
of the CAA is “to balance environmental protection with economic 
growth,” EPA’s interpretation of this “balancing,” under the doctrine of 
Chevron deference must be accorded great weight.103  Those who believe 
that EPA is acting outside of its authority claim that this is nothing more 
than EPA changing a number that it believes not to be workable after its 
inability to provide a “reasonable” construction of a statutory term in 
context.104  However, what EPA is doing is to rectify the policy of both 
PSD and Title V with the legislative history of the CAA “to balance 
environmental protection with economic growth.”105  This action is 
consistent with the holding in Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala.106  As the 
court in Shalala opined: 
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet 
not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its 
makers . . . . If a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act 
must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.107  
Applying the Shalala holding to this instance, the Agency must, under 
Chevron Step One, select an interpretation that most closely approximates 
congressional intent.108 
a.  Application of the Absurd Results Doctrine for                                         
the PSD Program 
As noted earlier, EPA’s recent promulgation of LDVR triggered the 
applicability of the PSD program for stationary GHG-emitting sources at 
 102. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
 103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 104. Peabody Energy Co., supra note 96, at 9. 
 105. Frost, Jr. et al., supra note 20. 
 106. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,542; Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 
140 F.3d 1060, 1068–69 (DC Cir. 1998). 
 107. Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1068; see also Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. 
at 459–60; U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68–69 (1994) (rejecting the 
“most natural grammatical reading” of a statute to avoid “absurd” results); Green, 490 
U.S. at 527–29 (Scalia, J., concurring); In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d 428, 434 (D.C. Cir. 
1991); Dougherty, supra note 66.  
 108. Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1068–69; see also Final Tailoring Rule, supra 
note 3, at 31,541–46. 
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the 100/250 tpy threshold levels as of January 2, 2011.109  PSD 
applicability hinges on the definition of “major emitting facility,” a 
source that emits more than a certain amount of a pollutant as defined by 
EPA—an amount defined by EPA’s New Source Performance Standards 
(“NSPS”).  The major emitting facility, under EPA’s long-standing 
narrowing interpretation and absent further tailoring, applies PSD 
requirements to sources of any air pollutant subject that is subject to 
regulation under the CAA.110  In this case, EPA’s promulgation of 
LDVR means that emitters of GHGs became subject to regulation on the 
date the rule took effect, January 2, 2011.111 
Absent tailoring, this trigger date would have subjected an extraordinarily 
large number of sources to regulation—the great majority of which would 
have been small commercial or residential sources.112  It is the belief of 
EPA that for many reasons, this result is contrary to congressional intent 
for the PSD program, and in fact would severely undermine what Congress 
sought to accomplish with the program.113  As a result, under the Chevron 
analysis, accounting for the absurd results doctrine, the statutory definition 
for “major emitting facility” should not be read to apply to all GHG 
sources at or above the 100/250 tpy threshold as of the trigger date.114  
Instead, the definitions of “major emitting facility” and “modification” 
should be tailored so that they apply to GHG sources on a phased-in 
basis, regulating only the largest sources first.115 
Chevron Step One calls for a determination of congressional intent, 
and courts consider the best indicator of congressional intent to be the 
plain meaning of the statute in question.116  However, the Supreme Court 
held in Ron Pair Enterprises that the literal meaning of a statute is not 
conclusive when the “literal application” of a statute produces results 
“demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.”117  To determine 
whether the intentions of the drafters differ from the result produced 
from “literal application” of the statutory provisions in question, courts 
may examine the overall context of the statutory provisions.118  This 
overall context includes whether there are related statutory provisions 
that either conflict or are consistent with that interpretation, and the 
 109. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,576. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 31,554, 31,576. 
 113. Id. at 31,554. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 31,555. 
 116. Id. at 31,554. 
 117. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
 118. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,576. 
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legislative history to see if it exposes what the legislature meant by the 
terms in question.119  In addition, courts may examine whether a literal 
application of the provisions produces a result that the courts characterize 
variously as “absurd, futile, strange, or indeterminate” and therefore so 
illogical or otherwise contrary to sensible public policy as to be beyond 
anything Congress would reasonably have intended.120  In such cases, the 
literal language cannot be said to reflect the intention of the drafters and 
therefore does not control.121  It is for such reasons that the Tailoring 
Rule is not only justified, but also necessary to comport with 
congressional intent. 
Congress was keenly aware of the fact that the PSD program needed 
to serve dual purposes: to protect the environment and to promote economic 
growth.122  As such, Congress explicitly identified these goals in the 
“purposes” section of the PSD provision.123  For example, to protect 
economic growth, the PSD program expedites the permit process to 
include a 1-year limitation on the time that the permitting authority has 
to act on permit applications.124  To protect the environment, in addition 
to including many provisions that focus on pollutants regulated by 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), the PSD program 
requires that the preconstruction permit impose emission limits that reflect 
BACT for each pollutant subject to regulation under another provision, 
CAA section 165(a)(4).125  This BACT provision also clarifies, by its terms, 
that although Congress designed the PSD program largely with NAAQS 
pollutants in mind, Congress also intended that sources subject to PSD 
control the emissions of their other pollutants as well.126  Moreover, the 
D.C. Circuit has recognized the twin goals of environmental protection 
and economic development that underlie PSD, and has upheld EPA 
interpretations of the PSD program that reflect a balancing of those 
goals.127 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 31,554. 
 121. Id. at 31,554–55; see Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242–43; Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). 
 122. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,555. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.; see, e.g., New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rehearing en 
banc den. 431 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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Congress paid careful attention to the types and sizes of sources that 
would be subject to the PSD program and designed the thresholds 
deliberately to limit the program’s scope.128  This behavior is evident 
from the legislative history; several Senate floor statements and the 
Committee Report made clear that the PSD program should not apply to 
small sources.129  Within the legislative history, Senator Edmund Muskie130 
stated that the Senate bill excluded from regulation “houses, dairies, 
farms, highways, hospitals, schools, grocery stores, and other such 
sources.”131  Senator James A. McClure132 stated that PSD provisions 
should be limited to “industrial plants of significant impact,” and should 
exclude “[a] small gasoline jobber, or a heating plant at a community 
college, [which] could have the potential to emit 100 tons of pollution 
annually.”133  The Senate Committee Report mirrored Senator McClure’s 
statement, and concisely articulated the cost-related basis for the line 
drawing: 
[The PSD] procedure . . . must include an effective review-and-permit process. 
Such a process is reasonable and necessary for very large sources, such as new 
electrical generating plants or new steel mills.  But the procedure would prove 
costly and potentially unreasonable if imposed on construction of storage facilities 
for a small gasoline jobber or on the construction of a new heating plant at a 
junior college, each of which may have the potential to emit 100 tons of pollution 
annually.134 
In 1980, the D.C. Circuit had occasion in Alabama Power, to 
acknowledge this legislative history.135  “Congress’s intention was to 
identify facilities which, due to their size, are financially able to bear the 
substantial regulatory costs imposed by the PSD provisions and which, 
as a group, are primarily responsible for emissions of the deleterious 
pollutants that befoul our nation’s air.”136  From the legislative history, it 
seems clear that Congress intended that PSD requirements be limited to 
a relatively small number of large industrial sources.137  Without any 
tailoring, the PSD program would expand from the current 280 sources 
 128. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,555. 
 129. Id. 
 130. (D-ME) United States Senator from 1959 to 1980, Governor of Maine from 
1955 and 1959, and Secretary of State under Jimmy Carter from 1980 to 1981. 
 131. 123 CONG. REC. 18021 (June 8, 1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie); Final 
Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,555. 
 132. (R-ID) United States Senator from 1973 to 1991. 
 133. 122 CONG. REC. 24548–49 (July 29, 1976) (statement of Sen. McClure); Final 
Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,555. 
 134. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,555. 
 135. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 353; Final Tailoring Rule, supra 
note 3, at 31,555. 
 136. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,555. 
 137. Id. 
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per year to nearly 82,000 sources.138  More than 99% of such sources 
would be smaller than those currently in the PSD program and would be 
small commercial and residential sources.139 
Besides the overly broad scope of the coverage, the total additional 
costs would be over $1.5 billion, compared with $12 million for the 
current PSD program.140  As illustrated above, this result would be contrary 
to the legislative history and Congress’s careful efforts to confine PSD 
to large industrial sources.  For these reasons, the absurd results doctrine 
must be applied to continue complying with the congressional intent of 
the PSD program. 
b.  Application of the Absurd Results Doctrine for the Title V Program 
Due to the parallels between the PSD and Title V applicability provisions, 
much of the discussion concerning Title V mirrors the discussion of PSD 
above.  Title V applicability provisions provide that after the effective 
date of the Title V program, it is unlawful for any person to operate a 
“major source” without a Title V permit.141  Under the current 
interpretation of Title V, similar to the PSD applicability provisions, 
EPA’s recent promulgation of LDVR triggered the applicability of Title 
V for GHG sources at the 100 tpy threshold levels as of January 2, 
2011.142  Absent tailoring, the trigger date would have seen some 6.1 
million sources become subject to Title V, an increase of over 400-fold 
of the previous number of sources subject to regulation.143 
For many reasons, this result is contrary to congressional intent for the 
Title V program and would severely undermine what Congress sought to 
accomplish with the program.144  If Title V were compelled to apply to 
GHG sources at the 100 tpy level, all sources newly subject to Title V 
would need to apply for permits.145  Commercial and residential sources 
would incur, on average, expenses of $23,175, while an industrial source 
would incur expenses of $46,350, to prepare a permit application and 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 31,557. 
 141. Id. at 31,562. 
 142. Id. at 31,577. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 31,562. 
 145. Id. 
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receive a permit.146  The majority of these newly included sources would 
be small commercial and residential sources that Congress never intended 
to be included in Title V.147  For example, the legislative history of Title 
V indicated that Congress did not expect that “printers, furniture makers, 
dry cleaners, and millions of other small businesses” would become 
subject to Title V.148  These sources generally do not have the potential 
to emit criteria pollutants at or above the 100 tpy threshold.149  Yet, such 
sources would need to receive these costly permits as they carry a 
potential to emit GHGs above that threshold.150 
The costs of this program to permitting authorities would be 
staggering.151  A permitting authority would expend an average of 214 
hours, which according to EPA would cost $9,844, to issue a permit to a 
commercial or residential source.152  These numbers would double to 
428 hours and $19,688, to issue a permit to an industrial source.153  In 
total, without tailoring, these permitting authorities would face over $21 
billion in additional permitting costs each year due to GHGs.154  This 
compares to the current program cost of $62 million each year, less than 
one-third of one percent of the estimated cost under an untailored 
application of the program.155  EPA estimates that the permitting process 
would take longer than [ten] years to complete.156  “These delays would 
undermine the overall statutory design that promotes the smooth running 
of the permitting process and the underlying purpose of the Title V 
program itself.”157 
After looking to Congress’s careful efforts to confine these sources, 
such an outcome must be seen as an “absurd result.”  Accordingly, under 
Chevron, accounting for the absurd results doctrine, the statutory 
definition for “major source” could not have been intended to apply to 
all GHG sources at or above the 100 tpy threshold as of the trigger 
date.158  Therefore, the definition of “major source” must be tailored to 
 146. Id. at 31,563. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101–490, pt. 1B (1990)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 31,563–64. 
 152. Id. at 31,563. 
 153. Id. at 31,563–64. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 31,564. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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apply to GHG sources on a phased-in basis, with only the largest sources 
first.159  EPA’s Tailoring Rule should stand. 
2.  The Validity of EPA’s Interpretation of the Administrative                 
Necessity Doctrine 
Contrary to Texas’s assertion, the administrative necessity doctrine 
receives support from and is the appropriate justification for EPA’s 
departure from the unambiguous terms of the CAA.160  The D.C. Circuit 
provided its most robust expression of the administrative necessity 
doctrine in its 1980 decision, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle.161  In Alabama 
Power, the court resolved the challenges of industry and consumer 
groups to many aspects of the regulations that EPA promulgated soon 
after enactment of the 1977 CAA Amendments to implement the 
recently enacted statutory provisions.162  One regulatory provision 
intended to “exempt sources that qualified as major emitting facilities if 
their actual emissions were 50 tpy or less.”163  EPA sought to justify this 
provision under the auspices of administrative necessity because nearly 
2,400 facilities emitted 50 tpy or less, believing the burdens of permit 
development and review would outweigh the small benefits of 
permitting.164  The court invalidated this regulatory exemption, stating it 
was not statutorily authorized; however, in so doing, the court recognized 
EPA’s concerns about administrative burdens and articulated the basis 
for the administrative necessity doctrine.165 
The court described the basis for the administrative necessity doctrine 
as “an overlay on clear statutory intent.”166  Specifically, the court held 
that “[c]ertain limited grounds for the creation of exemptions are 
inherent in the administrative process, and their unavailability under a 
 159. Id. 
 160. State of Texas’ Motion for a Stay of EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
supra note 24, at 11–12. 
 161. Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 73, at 55,312. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 55,312; Alabama Power Co., 636 F.2d at 323. 
 165. Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 73, at 55,312; see Alabama Power Co., 
636 F.2d at 356–57. 
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statutory scheme should not be presumed, save in the face of the most 
unambiguous demonstration of congressional intent to foreclose them.”167 
The Alabama Power court stressed the importance of ease of 
administration.  Most importantly, the Court held that EPA, in interpreting 
the “modification” provisions that apply PSD to physical or operational 
changes by major emitting facilities that “increase the amount of any air 
pollutant emitted,” may “exempt from PSD review some emission 
increases on grounds of de minimis or administrative necessity.”168  The 
Court went on to state that in establishing the exemption thresholds, “[t]he 
Agency should look at the degree of administrative burden posed by 
enforcement at various de minimis threshold levels.”169 
Next, the court identified three types of administrative relief that may 
be available to an agency.170  The first is “[c]ategorical exemptions from 
the clear commands of a regulatory statute,” which the court stated are 
“sometimes permitted,” but “not favored.”171  The second is “an 
administrative approach not explicitly provided in the statute,” such as 
“streamlined agency approaches or procedures where the conventional 
course, typically case-by-case determinations, would, as a practical 
matter, prevent the agency from carrying out the mission assigned to it 
by Congress.”172  The third type of administrative relief is a “delay of 
deadlines” upon “a showing by [the agency] that publication of some of 
the guidelines by that date is infeasible.”173  Finally, the court expounded 
upon the fact that it would assess “whether the agency faced an 
administrative impossibility and the acceptability of the agency’s choices, 
based on the totality of the circumstances confronting the agency.”174  
The court cautioned that “administrative necessity” is a difficult standard to 
achieve because “the agency [bears] a heavy burden to demonstrate the 
existence of an impossibility.”175 
As in Alabama Power, the issue at hand is similarly situated.  Both of 
these situations deal with the CAA and involve contested interpretations 
of statutory language.  The court in Alabama Power also stressed the 
 167. Alabama Power Co., 636 F.2d at 357. 
 168. Id. at 400, 405. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 358–59. 
 171. Alabama Power Co., 636 F.2d at 358; Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 
31,556. 
 172. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,556. 
 173. Alabama Power Co., 636 F.2d at 359.  See also Final Tailoring Rule, supra 
note 3, at 31,563 (asserting that the literal application of Title V would make it infeasible 
for the agency to meet deadlines). 
 174. Alabama Power Co., 636 F.2d at 359.  See also Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, 
at 31,563 (appealing for relief because the program would be otherwise “unadministrable”). 
 175. Alabama Power Co., 636 F.2d at 359. 
414 
 
VINCENT - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2016  1:13 PM 
[VOL. 3:  393, 2011–12]  Administrative Absurdity 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
importance of “administrability,” a concept that plays a large role in the 
current situation as well.  The Alabama Power court held that EPA, in 
interpreting the “modification” provisions that apply PSD to physical or 
operational changes by major emitting facilities that “increase the 
amount of any air pollutant emitted,”176 may “exempt from PSD review 
some emission increases on grounds of de minimis or administrative 
necessity.”177  However, the Court continued to state that in establishing 
the exemption thresholds, “the Agency should look at the degree of 
administrative burden posed by enforcement at various de minimis 
threshold levels.”178  In these statements, the court not only provided 
credence for the doctrine of administrative necessity, but also for the 
exact application that EPA uses here for tailoring the provisions of the 
PSD program. 
Absent tailoring, the January 2, 2011 trigger date for GHG PSD 
applicability would have seen some 6.1 million sources become subject to 
Title V—an increase of over 400-fold.179  The costs to the permitting 
authorities would also increase from $62 million to $21 billion, and the 
permitting authorities would need to hire, train, and manage 229,118 
employees according to EPA estimates.180  Moreover, the overall cost to all 
6.1 million sources would be $49 billion per year over a 3-year period.181  
Imposing burdens of this magnitude on these sources would be contrary 
to Congress’s efforts to minimize the expenses of Title V, especially to 
small sources.182  Similarly, absent tailoring, the total additional costs 
would be over $1.5 billion for the current PSD program, compared with 
$12 million presently.183  The PSD program would expand from the current 
280 sources per year to nearly 82,000 sources.184  More than 99% of 
such sources would be smaller than those currently in the PSD program 
and would be small commercial and residential sources.185   
 176. Id. at 400; Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,563 (quoting Clean Air Act 
§ 111(a)(4) (2011)). 
 177. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 3, at 31,563. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 31,577. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 31,563. 
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 183.  Id. at 31,557. 
 184.  Id. 
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Essentially, the situation that would emerge from a literal application 
of the PSD and Title V programs to all GHG sources would almost 
certainly beget both multi-year delays in issuance of all permits and 
exorbitant costs to permitting authorities as well as to sources.186  This 
literal interpretation would apply PSD and Title V to millions of sources 
that Congress did not expect to be covered, and the ensuing administrative 
burdens would impede the issuance of permits to the thousands of 
sources that Congress did expect to be covered.187  The sheer magnitude 
of the numbers involved clearly indicates that the result of a literal 
application of the PSD and Title V provisions to GHG sources cannot be 
what Congress intended and must therefore be covered by the 
administrative necessity doctrine.  Most importantly, it appears quite 
certain that EPA has met the “heavy burden” in demonstrating “the 
existence of an impossibility” that the court spoke about in Alabama 
Power. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment addressed a number of legal arguments submitted by 
states and industry advocates that are legally insufficient to overrule the 
regulations made by EPA and the deference accorded to EPA’s 
interpretations in light of the Chevron ruling.  The most important reason 
why applying the PSD and Title V programs to GHG sources without 
tailoring would be inconsistent with congressional intent is that the 
resulting program would prove administratively impossible.  Aside 
from the staggering costs that would be added to these programs and the 
sources therein regulated, adding over 6.1 million permit applications to 
the less than 15,000 that currently exist would overwhelm permitting 
authorities and for all practical purposes would bring the permitting 
process to a standstill.188 
The Tailoring Rule symbolizes a number of complex legal issues.  
This Comment does not seek to resolve each of these individual issues.  
However, this Comment does strive to analyze the legal arguments of 
each side in this debate concerning the doctrines of administrative necessity 
and absurd results.  In doing so, it seems that the deference afforded by 
Chevron gives EPA more than sufficient juridical credence to ensure that 
EPA will prevail. 
As stated by the Supreme Court in 2009, the interpretation applied by 
EPA governs “if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not 
 186. Id. at 31,564. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 31,540. 
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necessarily the only possible . . . interpretation, nor even the interpretation 
deemed most reasonable by the courts.”189  Certainly, EPA’s interpretation 
is not the only possible interpretation.  However, in the present instance, 
it seems most difficult to argue that the interpretation of EPA is not “a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.”  In light of Chevron, administrative 
deference to agency decision-making receives a great amount of weight, 
and the administrative burdens that would be placed on these sources 
and permitting agencies would be insurmountable.  For these reasons, 
EPA will be successful in any of the legal arguments challenging the 
validity of EPA’s use of the administrative necessity and absurd results 
doctrines.  Consequently, the judiciary should validate EPA’s use of 
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